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HY was George Meredith, like so many of the Victorian philosophes, reticent about the sources of his philosophy? Perhaps he believed that his idea of nature was his own creation; or perhaps he felt that he had indicated his teacher (or teachers) clearly enough for posterity. Whatever was the case, his silence has aroused much speculation. Tennyson has been named as the inspiration of the sentimental spiritualism in Meredith's early nature poems; Mary (Peacock Nicolls) Meredith has been given credit for his belief in the spirituality of love and for his courageous outlook on life; the Moravian brothers of Neuwied and Thomas Love Peacock have been suggested as possible sources of Meredith's altruism; R. H . Home and Wordsworth have been mentioned as contributors to the poet's embryonic nature philosophy; and even Shelley, James Thomson, and August Comte have received their due for influencing Meredith in the early years of his life. AIl these hypotheses, it is true, are supported by the idea of nature that one finds in Meredith's poems. However, it seems to me that if one takes all these suggestions into account one must assume that Meredith's philosophy of nature was a patched-up conception. There is no evidence in Meredith's poetry to justify that assumption.
Nor is there any valid evidence to support Lionel Stevenson's assertion that Meredith did not formulate his philosophy until after Darwin had published his Origin of Species: "George Meredith had little perception of the idea [evolution] till the scientists announced it; but thereafter he devoted himself to it unstintingly. When he became acquainted with Darwinism, his philosophic system developed promptly and completely.''' Mr. Stevenson, I believe, puts the matter too bluntly. The very fact that Meredith does not mention Darwin in his letters indicates that the scientist's theory had the effect perhaps of unifying the poet's already existing philosophy but not of adding anything of import to it.
That Meredith had laid the basis for his concept of nature before 1859 and that this concept was founded upon one source of wisdom, one coherent philosophy of life into which all the disturbing facts of nineteenth-century science could be fitted, is an hypothesis that explains the relative consistency of the poet's idea of nature better than does anyone of those advanced thus far. When I consider the logic of these assumptions, I can make no choice of oracle for George Meredith other than Goethe, the man whom Meredith himself praised as the "most enduring'" influence of all influences affecting his philosophy. As Meredith tells us in his letters, Goethe's faith in the unity of the real and the ideal, Goethe's belief that the ideal must be based upon the real, was the foundation of his whole philosophy of Earth: "Between realism and idealism there is no natural conflict. This completes that .... I hold the man who gives a plain wall of fact higher in esteem than one who is constantly shuflling the clouds .... Does not all science (the mammoth balloon, to wit) tell us that when we forsake earth, we reach up to a frosty, inimical Inane? For my part I love and cling to earth, as the one piece of God's handiwork which we possess. I admit that we can refashion; but of earth must be the material."3
II
On the basis of his faith in this unity of the subjective and objective aspects of the world Meredith fashioned a philosophy devoid of contradiction. Because he accepted Goethe's contention that "Man is born, not to solve the problems of the universe, but to find out where the problem applies, and then to restrain himself within the limits of the comprehensible,'" Meredith decided that his conception of the ideal in nature had to be consistent with this realistic approach to Earth. Like his teacher he insisted, therefore, that man should accept without qualification nature in her "beauty and wisdom, gentleness, joyance, and kindness,'" for he conceived complete acceptance of nature to be a prerequisite to human knowledge and freedom.' ecf. Eckermann, Conversations. 157-Gocthe's idea of freedom is similar to that of Meredith: "Freedom consists not in refusing to recognize anything above us, but in respecting something which is above us; for, by respecting it, we raise ourselves to it, and, by our very acknowledgment, prove that we bear within ourselves what is higher, and are worthy to be on a level with it," And seats his soul upo" her wings, And broadens o'er the wind-swept world With her, will ","ther in the flight More knowledge of her secret, more Delight in her beneficence, , Than hours of musing, or the lore That lives with men could ever give !7
159
Thus spoke Meredith in one of his early poems. And thus he continued to speak even after Darwinism had made its impact upon his thought, for he saw clearly that his concept of ethical evolution depended upon his belief in nature's beneficence:
Count Nature devilish, and accept for doom
The cllasm between our passions and OUf wits!S That is, Meredith, though he began after 1859 to lay great stress on man's struggle with "the elements, whose dower First sprang him,'" retained his firm belief that if man would but make proper use of his free will he should discern the essential goodness of Earth. In order to avoid destroying a well-founded philosophy, the poet ignored at least two of Darwin's scientific observations: that nature was amoral and that the nature of man was necessarily deterministic.
Nevertheless, Meredith did not divorce man's free will from nature; he stated rather that free will owed its very existence to the immutable law of Earth that could not be read as an anthropomorphic reRection of man's changeable feeling. In other words, freedom of choice was for Meredith, as for Milton and Goethe, an either-or proposition; man must either conform with nature's law or perish. Yet the Victorian poet insisted that there was a choice. For he believed that man could never evolve ethically unless he accepted the responsibility for his mistakes. Too long, said Meredith, had man placed the blame on nature's law, which, though unalterable and severe," was never at fault; man's inability to perceive nature's true purpose tempted mankind to see blemishes in nature, but these faults were just reRections of man's ego and not imperfections in the Mother."
And what was this one law of nature that both Meredith and Goethe praised so highly? For Goethe it had been an all-pervasive law IOcr. Goethe (Eckermann, Conversations, 294); "nature understa nds no jesting; she is always true, always serious, always severe; ahe is always right, and the errors and Caults arc always those of man." 1leE. Goethe (ibid., 75): UNature goes her own way .. . and all that to us seems an exception is really according to order." of change, "a great law which pervades all nature and on which all life and all the joy of life depend . .. [a law having to dol not only with our other senses, but also with our higher spiritual nature.))12 Hence Meredith also recognized change, exemplified by alternating life and death, as nature's one law of necessity. Even before 1850 the English poet could look upon death as prophetic of more life, as a means of producing life; the death of the snowdrop was to him not an occasion for grief, for it heralded the birth of the rose." And it was but a short step from this early idea to Meredith's later justification of death as a sacrifice and a service to future generations,14 for the later conception was merely an extension of the earlier observation that death was a purposeful manifestation of the commendable prodigality of nature. Meredith's faith in the goodness of the law of change was as strong as that of Goethe; and Goethe's, as we know, was worshipful: "Let people serve Him who gives to the beast his fodder, and to man meat and drink as much as he can enjoy. But I worship Him who has infused into the world such a power of production that, when only the millionth part of it comes to life, the world swarms with creatures to such a degree that war, pestilence, fire, .and water cannot prevail against them. That is my God 1"" Malthusian and Darwinian proofs of waste in nature could have no efIect on a Meredith who looked upon death in this way. Certainly Darwin's stress on the struggle for existence did introduce into Meredith's philosophy a note of fortitude· to balance that of joy, but it did not bring about any change in Meredith's Goethian belief that man, reading nature aright, should see in Earth's stern law of development a confirmation of nature's love and spirit: But Ithe love I saw was a fitful thing; I looked on the sun That clouds or is 'blinding aglow: And the love around had more of wing Than substance, and of spirit none. Then looked I on the green earth we are rooted in, 
III
Because Meredith's conception of man's place in nature's scheme was consistent with his recognition of the unchanging law of change, he conceived man's first duty to he one of acting in conform·ance with this vital law. Therefore, like Goethe" (and unlike Wordsworth), he emphasized physical activity and joy in nature rather than mere passive acceptance of her henevolence. Even Darwin's sombre picture of the precariousness of man's existence could not dim M eredith's belief that man should live joyfully and actively: "Live with the world. No cloister. No languor. Play your part. Fill the day. Ponder well and loiter not. Let laughter brace you. Exist in everyday communion with Nature. Nature bids you take all, only be sure you Jearn how to do without.
HlS
Man's second duty, as Meredith saw it, was a corollary of the first one. Because the poet perceived that transience was part of nature's law, he felt that man should not barter present joy for the hopes and fears inspired by the spectre of Time. That is, Meredith contended that only by living for the moment could man ever hope to attain to the balance of the real and the ideal either through the harvesting of the results of his present toil by his progeny or through his own creation of the mean in the heat of the magic moment that embraces all time. Living for and working in the moment, Meredith believed, could make possible the only kinds of immortality man might expect,20 that is, either some physical evidence in his children (and in their descendants) that he had worked for the good of the race orand Meredith believed this type of immortality to be even finer than the first-a contribution to posterity of the finely balanced idea that is evolved by the best men (Shakespeare, for example) in creative moments:
Spirits, whose memory is our vital air, Through the great love of Earth they had: 10, these, Like beams that throw the path on tossing seas, Can bid us feel 'We keep them in the ghost, Partakers of a strife they joyed to share." This faith in creative development led Meredith to place mankind at the top of nature's scale," for it supported the poet's belief that man was capable of furthering nature's scheme of change and evolution better perhaps than nature herself. Yet Meredith saw clearly that in actuality man was not performing his duties with any degree of efficiency because he was wasting time in an attempt to ascertain the reasons for his own existence. Therefore Meredith, like Goethe before him," condemned this vain questioning; he constantly reminded his contemporaries that questions such as "Whither?" or "Whence?" were selfish queries that both slowed nature's and man's complementary tides of evolution and prevented man from assuming his true position at the right hand of nature herself.
Then let our trust be firm in Good, Though we be of the fasting; Our questions are a mortal brood, OUf work is everlasting.
We children of Beneficence
Are in its being sharers; And Whither vainer sounds than Whence, For word with such wayfarers. 
IV
Meredith, following Goethe's lead, thus came to regard ethical evolution as the result primarily of man's willingness to work without demanding personal immortality as a reward for his toil. Because he held with Goethe that "This preoccupation with immortality is for people ... who have nothing to do"" and because he had faith in the ability of humanity to evolve under the guidance of nature, Meredith could not concede that man's lot needed any justification. And since he did not agree with Darwin that self-preservation was the basic evolutionary urge, he could see no reason why man should desire a non-earthly reward. The poet's belief that the force behind evolution was altruism (or co-operation) rather than egotism (or self-preservation) made transcendentalism unnecessary to his philosophy.
Meredith apparently apprehended this connection between altruism and evolution well before 1859. At least, the following observation made by the poet in the Monthly Observer (c. 1850) convinces me that he was aware of the relationship: "The universe . . . is but a succession of links, and we are all united in nobility and gentleness and love."" This statement, when considered along with a similar one from an early poem, The Two Blackbirds, to the effect that "The ebb and /low of Nature's tide" is "A self-forgetful sympathy," constitutes strong evidence that Goethe," not Darwin, was the inspirer of Meredith's unscientific concept of evolution.
Moreover, the several parts of Meredith's theory of ethical evolution may well be Goethian in origin. Let us consider, for example, Goethian parallels to Meredith's belief that struggle was the means man should use to evolve ethically. Goethe certainly had no inkling of the Darwinian "struggle for existence." Yet he did stress the need for struggle in the development of man's whole being: ". . . it is in conflict with natures opposed to his own that a man must collect his strength to fight his way through; and thus all our different sides are brought out and developed so that we soon feel ourselves a match for every foe."" And he expressed a firm belief that nature would yield her secrets only to the man who had achieved this balance of 25Eckermann, CORt1STsations, 45. 20Sencourt, Msredith. 27 (quoted from an unpublished MS in Widener Library at Harvard ) .
ncr. Goethe on altruism in birds (Eekermann, Conversations, 412): "Did Dot God inspire the bird with this all-powerful love for its young, and did not similar impulses pervade all animate nature, the world could not subsist. But this is the divine energy everywhere diffused, and divine love everywhere active," 28lbid., 59.
the various sides of his nature: "The man incapahle of appreciating her she despises; and only to the apt, the pure, and the true does she resign herself, and reveal her secrets."" In other words, Goethe was in favour of a struggle for balance that would lead man to a proper appreciation of essential altruism. Is not Meredith's idea of struggle, though it is tinged with Darwinism, basically the same as this concept of Goethe's? Nowhere did Meredith imply that ethical evolution involves a struggle for existence. His "Triad" of blood, brain, and spirit represented instead the ultimate balance of selfless instinct, intelligence, and altruism; and his "fittest" were not those men who had survived through natural selection, but rather those who had worked in life to attain this perfect balance so that present and future generations of humanity might approach closer and closer to the desirable mean:
If that thou hast the gift of strength, then know Thy part is to uplift the trodden low; Else in the giant's grasp until the end A hopeless wrestler shall thy soul contend.'· The actual elements of Meredith's Triad, those constituents of the balance to be attained through struggle with self, also, I do not doubt, had their origin with Goethe. The Meredithian conception of "blood," for example, as an essential, though the least important, part of man's being, echoed a similar helief of Goethe's: "The separation of the sensual from the moral, which in the complicated, cultivated world sunders the feelings of love and desire, produces ... an exaggeration which can lead to no good."" Thus Meredith and Goethe both contended that "honest passion" was necessary to the ethical balance; and they both emphasized the need to prevent this heneficial force of blood being rendered impotent by the selfish impulses of egotism and sentimentality. The English poet, in attacking the sentimentalist for letting the "scaly dragon of self" frighten him away from the reality of nature's struggle for survival (which was but part of the law of change for Meredith) -Hawk or shrike has done this deed Of downy feathers, a cruel sight.
Sweet sentimentalist, intercede
With Providence: it is not rightl Uwas merely restating Goethe's view on t!Ie matter, for Goethe also had had in him a "cross-grained humour ... to hoot everything senti-"Ibid., 294. mental, and half-despairingly to cleave to inevitable reality."" And, in condemning the egoist as a "distempered devil of self,"" Meredith was but particularizing Goethe's warning of the danger of "elevating oneself to the Absolute and sacrificing everything to the carrying out of an idea."" Goethe's suggestion that a desirable balance of blood, brain, and spirit does exist," rather than Darwin's scientific theory of evolution, was doubtless the source of Meredith's faith in the evolutionary power of that Triad:
. . . grasp Very sap of the vital in this: ThaJt from flesh unto spirit man grows Even here on the sod under sun . . .. 81 v Let me repeat that for Meredith ethical evolution, though a product of man's free will, was part of nature's benevolent and vital plan. The difficult struggle for improvement, symbolized for Meredith by the turbulent wind above the pine, the race of life which drops its dead while it exalts its living, was closely related to the law of change, the law of life and death so well exemplified by the pine tree quietly dropping its non-fertilized seed:
A wind SW"ays the pines, And below Not a breath of wild air: All still as the mosses that glow On the flooring and over the lines Of the roots here and there. The pine-tree drops its dead:
They are quiet as under the sea.
Overhead, overhead, Rushes life in a race, As the clouds the clouds chase:
And we go, And we drop like the fruits of the tree, Because of his belief in this relationship Meredith saw that man's objective of attaining to the ideal through the real was feasible only if man recognized an all-inclusive unity-nature, God, and man had to be all of a piece. Hence the poet could readily agree with Goethe that "The God who stands in immediate connection with nature, and owns and loves it as his work, seemed to him the proper God,"" for he conceived of God as being indistinguishable from Earth, to which both he and Goethe assigned ethical will as well as creative force. Their God was the pure spirit of altruism that existed in man (if he could but see it) and in nature. There was, however, one small difference between Goethe's God and Meredith's: Meredith's Supreme Being was as much an outcome of the poet's concept of ethical evolution as of Goethian pantheism. God for Meredith was both the third member of the Triad and the living spirit in nature. And yet both these definitions of God had been in Meredith's mind during the formative years when Goethe's influence was so strong. Meredith had merely used Darwinism to make more definite the ethical implications of Goethe's philosophy. Hence God remained the spirit of nature whether Meredith approached Him either by way of Goethian naturalism or by way of evolution, for Meredith's faith in the oneness of the real and the ideal worlds made the two conceptions of God identical with each other. It is reasonable to conclude then that this Goethian idea of Earth's unity was the Meredithian belief that stood firm in the face of all conflicting thought (Darwinism included) of the Victorian period. Meredith could always believe in nature's beneficent spirit, the divine "Over-Reason" which was God, either through a joyous faith in ethical evolution that involved stoical recognition of struggle or through a courageous acceptance of nature's stern law of necessity, behind which the poet could discern joy, sacrifice, and love; for both approaches were consistent with his view of the real and ideal worlds as a basic identity, as a fundamental example of the mean which he and Goethe saw in every phase of nature's completeness. 89Truth and Poetry, 30.
